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Abstract
We analyze the interaction between job tenure and external la-
bor market conditions in wage determination. First, we introduce a
model that combines job matching with business-cycle eﬀects. As the
employment relationship progresses, the worker appropriates a por-
tion of the value of the match-speciﬁc human capital she accumulates,
gradually becoming shielded from the cyclical variations in external
labor market conditions: the employment relationship is progressively
“internalized”. Then, we present empirical evidence supporting this
prediction: the elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate decreases
with tenure. This ﬁnding is robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations that al-
low for job heterogeneity, and it contributes to the interpretation of
recent evidence of changes in the eﬀect of the business cycle on wages.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The labor economics literature has dedicated increasing attention in recent
years to the study of the reasons why some labor markets tend to internalize
the wage process, thereby diﬀering in their functioning from what standard
competitive models would predict. This discussion can be traced back to
Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) analysis of “ports of entry” in speciﬁcj o b s .
The existence of employer- (or match-) speciﬁc human capital is usually
given as an explanation of long-term employment relationships during which
practices common to internal labor markets can be developed. Such analyses
have recently been enriched with the introduction of issues of information
and learning (e.g. Gibbons and Katz, 1991, Gibbons and Waldman 1999).
Another strand of the literature has resulted in the debate over the exis-
tence of some kind of returns to tenure, which dates back to the 1960’s with
the work of Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967). Speciﬁcally, the main
issue is the role of speciﬁc human capital1 in wage determination. The ac-
cumulation of employer-speciﬁc capital may thus lead to an increasing wage
pattern as the employment relationship progresses through time. Here as
well, informational and learning aspects have recently been added to the dis-
c u s s i o no fh o ws o m ek i n do fm a t c h - s p e c i ﬁc characteristics can be used to
explain wage and turnover dynamics, as happens in Jovanovic (1979) and
Felli and Harris (1996) among others.
This paper draws from both of these approaches. On one hand, we are
interested in match-speciﬁc human capital to the extent that it generates
returns to tenure. In addition, we take the internal labor market literature’s
description of which wage patterns, being at odds with the standard com-
p e t i t i v em o d e l ,c a nb er e c o n c i l e dw i t hm a t c h - s p e c i ﬁc processes2.B u t o u r
f o c u si ss o m e w h a td i ﬀerent. Namely, we attempt to study how tenure and
1We use a broad deﬁnition of speciﬁc human capital as in Farber (1999). The inter-
pretation of match-speciﬁc human capital is that of everything valuable in the particular
match that has no value for either party outside the match.
2Note however that, although Doeringer and Piore (1971) attribute investment in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital and on-the-job-training as one of the reasons for the existence of
ILMs, there are other reasons oﬀered (such as costumary law) that are not a function of
match-speciﬁc capital and therefore are not considered here.
2labor market conditions interact in the process of wage determination. In
other words, we examine how the wage-setting process might be inﬂuenced
in diﬀerent ways by the so called “external labor market” conditions and re-
turns to speciﬁc human capital accumulation as the employment relationship
evolves. This points at a connection between speciﬁc capital accumulation
and the progressive “internalization” of the wage setting process.
We argue that in the course of the employment relationship, as tenure and
speciﬁc human capital accumulate, labor market conditions have a diﬀerent
impact on wages and turnover decisions. These decisions reﬂect concerns
about the quality of the match and speciﬁc investments made by both em-
ployer and employee and are related to factors other than labor market con-
ditions. Our claim will be that whether or not we observe practices consistent
with implicit contracting, that “shield” the worker from the “vagaries” of the
external labor market, depends on how much tenure has been accumulated
in a given match. In particular, we present a model and empirical evidence
suggesting that external labor market conditions have a lower eﬀect on a
worker’s wage the higher her tenure in her current job.
Our model takes a simpliﬁed version of the framework in Jovanovic (1979)
a sas t a r t i n gp o i n t .W o r k e r sa n dﬁrms are matched randomly and the qual-
ity of any given match is an “experience good”: its value is learned as the
employment relationship progresses. We interpret the information both par-
ties have about match quality as match-speciﬁc human capital. Thus, higher
tenure implies that more match-speciﬁc human capital has been accumu-
lated3. In addition to these features –and this is our main innovation– we
introduce business-cycle eﬀects. We thereby create the scope needed to ana-
lyze the interaction between learning about match quality –i.e. investment
in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital– and external labor market conditions as they
are aﬀected by the business cycle. The main implication of the model is that,
as the employment relationship progresses and speciﬁc human capital is ac-
3Other papers, such as Flinn (1986) and Topel and Ward (1992), have used the notion
of jobs as “experience goods” to study job mobility. Flinn presents an empirical analysis
of wage growth for male new entrants using a highly structured model based on a version
of the matching model in Jovanovic (1979). He ﬁnds evidence of important match-speciﬁc
components in mobility decisions. Topel and Ward (1992) combine experience and search
characteristics of jobs and develop a mobility model based on wealth-maximizing on-the-
job search. Mobility decisions depend on wage evolution within a job as well as on the
arrival of external oﬀers. Consistently with the notion used in the present paper, they ﬁnd
that job-speciﬁc wages are a key determinant of mobility.
3cumulated, the worker, by receiving a fraction of the return to that human
capital –which is less cyclical than the value of outside job opportunities–
is gradually shielded from cyclical variations in the external labor market.
We then turn to test and conﬁrm this implication empirically. We take the
unemployment rate and the gross state product real growth rate as proxies
for cyclical conditions in the external labor market. Our basic ﬁnding is that
the elasticity of current wages to the current local business cycle indicator is
aﬀected by the length of match tenure. In addition to the well documented
eﬀe c to ft e n u r eo nw a g e s , 4 the wages-business cycle elasticityis lower for more
tenured workers. This result is robust to various speciﬁcations and sample
changes. We also examine and conﬁrm its validity when allowing for several
dimensions of job heterogeneity. In particular, we consider the possibility of
this eﬀect being sensitive to the worker’s number of years of education and
age. In the ﬁrst case, we conclude that a higher level of schooling makes
wages less cyclical and labor demand is also less sensitive to the business
cycle for older workers. This eﬀect is on top of the tenure eﬀect on wage
cyclicality, that remains unchaged in this speciﬁcation.
We test as well the eﬀect of tenure on the elasticity of current wages to
the local unemployment rate prevailing when the worker is hired. Our results
show that the eﬀect of initial conditions dies out as tenure progresses.
The combination of these two elasticity changes is consistent with the
hypothesis that the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital leads to an
increasing importance of implicit shielding agreements between employers
and workers in wage determination. For larger values of tenure the process
of wage determination cannot be described by a model of spot labor markets.
Finally, we study the possible existence of non-linearities in the tenure
eﬀect on wages. Our evidence shows that the internalization of the wage-
setting process is much faster during the ﬁrst year of tenure than later on
(note that this initial period is characterized by much faster learning about
match quality).
These results contribute to the recent debate on changes in human re-
sources management and changes in the nature of employment relationships.
From an empirical perspective, evidence of changes in the eﬀect of the busi-
ness cycle on wages is associated with structural changes in the contractual
relationship (see for example Bertrand, 1999). Speciﬁcally, it is sometimes
4See Topel (1991), and Altonji and Williams (1997) for a discussion of the returns to
tenure literature.
4argued that an increased sensitivity of wages to unemployment rates reﬂects
the fact that employment relationships have become more ﬂexible, less char-
acterized by agreements that shield workers from the labor market stance.
Our results on the tenure eﬀect on wages and the interpretation of tenure
as a proxy to match-speciﬁc human capital and learning point at a diﬀer-
ent eﬀect that should also be taken into account. In addition to possible
changes in the way wages are set, the sensitivity of wages to labor mar-
k e tc o n d i t i o n si sa l s oi n ﬂuenced by variations in the tenure composition of
the pool of workers. Given the evidence from the human resources literature
that restructuring processes and downsizing experiences hurt especially older
workers (see Capelli, 1995), this possible “recomposition” eﬀect could be an
important factor in explaining the observed increase in wage sensitivity.5
Our analysis is related to the one carried out by Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991), who also combine a contract model with cyclical eﬀects. They ex-
amine the relation between wages and the business cycle both theoretically
and empirically, and conclude that the current unemployment rate does not
aﬀect wages after controlling for the best labor market conditions since a
worker was hired at her current job. However, their model has no prediction
regarding how returns to tenure and the cycle interact in wage determina-
tion. Furthermore, our result below, according to which the cyclical behavior
of the wage rate decreases with tenure, not being at odds with their main
results, is better described as an alternative explanation for their ﬁndings.
If ﬁrms shield more tenured workers from the vagaries of the labor market,
whether one is to ﬁnd a large impact of the business cycle on wages will be
a function of the tenure composition of the pool of employed workers at any
given moment.
Other related papers are Felli and Harris (1996), Gibbons and Wald-
man (1999) and Farber (1999). Felli and Harris (1996) introduce a dynamic
model of speciﬁc capital that incorporates issues of information, matching
and turnover. This is the only dynamic model that we know of that has
implications for the slope of the tenure-earnings proﬁle. Both Gibbons and
Waldman (1999) and Farber (1999) present very stylized models of wage
dynamics in internal labor markets and with speciﬁc human capital, respec-
tively. In addition, as we mentioned above, Jovanovic (1979) presents an
example of a more dynamic set-up that combines speciﬁc capital and search
5See Neumark et al.(1999) for evidence that job stability declined in the 1990s for
workers with longer employment spells.
5– which serves as a starting point for our own model below. None of these
papers tackles the issue of how variations in the labor market stance associ-
ated with business cycle conditions aﬀect the wage proﬁle as the employment
relationship progresses.
Our work is also connected to the vast literature on the issue of how
real wages vary over the business cycle. In his seminal work, Bils (1985)
ﬁnds evidence that wages for job changers are strongly procyclical, but for
job stayers respond only weakly to the cycle. This conclusion has been con-
ﬁrmed by more recent papers (see for example Solon et al.,1994), which ﬁnd
incumbent workers’ wages to be procyclical although less so than they are
for job changers. These studies also ﬁnd evidence that wage cyclicality is
strongest among low-wage workers.
Section 2 presents the model. Its main empirical implication is that there
is an inverse relation between wage cyclicality and job tenure. Section 3
describes the testing methodology. We ﬁrst examine the basic implication of
our model. Later on, we expand the empirical approach in order to allow for,
ﬁrst, the possibility that human capital accumulation has diﬀerent degrees
of importance in diﬀerent jobs; and, second, the possibility that the eﬀect
of tenure on wages and on wage cyclicality is non-linear. The data to be
employed is described in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results,
and section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
In this section we present a model that analyzes the impact of the business
cycle on the process of wage determination as it evolves while tenure and
speciﬁc human capital accumulate. The key components of the model are:
(i) the existence of employer-speciﬁc human capital –valuable in the match
between the ﬁrm and the worker but with no value outside the match; (ii) the
appropriation by the worker of a fraction of the value of this speciﬁc capital;
and (iii) the interaction between that value and the labor market stance.
Labor is the only factor of production and ﬁrms’ technologies exhibit
constant returns to scale. Each worker lives two periods (t =0 ,1)a n dt h e r e
is no discounting. New workers and those that have quit their previous jobs
are matched randomly to ﬁrms. Each match between a ﬁrm and a worker
can be of two qualities: good or bad. Good matches generate one unit (zero
units) of production with probability p (1 − p)e a c hp e r i o d . B a dm a t c h e s ,
6however, always produce zero.
The quality of any match is unknown ex-ante. It is distributed identi-
cally and independently across matches. Information on match quality is
symmetric between the ﬁrm and the worker at all stages, and is updated
when production occurs. Hence, we take an informational interpretation of
match-speciﬁc human capital, as in Jovanovic (1979): as the employment re-
lationship progresses, both parties learn about the quality of the match, and
the information so gathered constitutes capital that is valuable only within
the match6.
Let Ψt be the state of the business cycle in period t.I tc a nt a k et w ov a l u e s ,
high (h)o rl o w . ( l). Ψt is i.i.d. across periods, and prob(Ψt = h)=ρ for all t.
The business cycle plays a role in the determination of the prior probability
distribution over the two possible qualities of a match. To economize on
notation, we take Ψt to be as well the probability that a match that starts
in period t be good. Namely, if an employment relationship begins in period
t and Ψt = h (Ψt = l), then the prior probability of a good match is h (l),
with 1 >h>l>0. That is, a match will turn out to be highly productive
with greater probability if it starts during a boom than if it starts during
a recession. We make this assumption for the sake of simplicity. We could
model the job-matching process in a more detailed fashion, having the ex-
ante value of a given match depend on the number of workers searching for
jobs and on the number of vacancies. In such a model, the relative abundance
of job searchers and vacancies during recessions would generate two opposing
eﬀects on the average quality of new matches. First, it would make it easier
for ﬁms and workers to attain good matches, since they would be choosing
from larger pools. But, on the other hand, it would also generate more
search frictions, making good matches less likely to happen. Then, we are
implicitly assuming that the second eﬀect prevails. This simpliﬁes our model
signiﬁcantly and allows it to stay very close to Jovanovic (1979), diﬀering only
in that the distribution of match qualities varies with the cycle. Furthermore,
the empirical evidence in Bowlus (1995) strongly suggests that the average
quality of new matches actually is procyclical.
We assume that, in each period, wages are determined by Nash bargain-
ing. That is, in any given match and in any given period, the corresponding
6To keep the model simple, we do not allow for the accumulation of general (i.e. pro-
ductive in all matches) human capital. The inclusion of such an accumulation would
add returns to experience to our results on returns to tenure, leaving all of our ﬁndings
unaltered.








expected value of production
from the match in period t
¸
,
where β is the worker’s bargaining power, assumed constant and the same
for all workers, with 0 <β<1. Of course, a worker will quit if the expected
value of production in the current match is lower than her outside option,
i.e. employment in a new match7.
The timing is as follows. In each period, the state of the business cycle
is determined and observed by workers and ﬁrms. Any worker in the second
period of her life then decides whether to stay in her current match or quit.
Subsequently, both new workers and those that have quit their previous
matches are randomly matched to a ﬁrm.Wage levels are then determined by
Nash bargaining. Finally, production occurs and the information on match
quality is thereby updated.
Any match that generates zero production during the worker’s ﬁrst period
reveals itself as bad. Therefore, the value of the match becomes lower than
the worker’s outside option —since any new match has a positive probability
of being good— and the match does not survive. If the match generates
positive production, beliefs about match quality will be updated accordingly.
Whether the match will survive or not will be determined by comparing
the continuation value of the match with the worker’s outside option. We





Let b h (b l) be the updated probability of a good match if Ψ0 = h (Ψ0 = l)
and one unit was produced at t =0 .8 Assumption 1 ensures that b l>h .This
implies that any match will survive if it generates one unit of production in
the worker’s ﬁrst period.
Take any given worker that faces a sequence (Ψ0,Ψ1) of states of the
business cycle along her life and whose match generates positive production
at t =0 .L e t w(t,Ψ0,Ψ1) be the wage she receives at t, t =0 ,1.W e
are interested in the interaction between tenure and the business cycle in
7We assume that the number of ﬁrms in the economy is large enough so that the
probability that a worker is matched to a ﬁrm where she previously worked is negligible.
8Straightforward application of Bayes’rule yields b h = h
h+(1−h)p, b l = l
l+(1−l)p.
8determining the values that w(.) may take. We obtain those values in what
follows.
At t =1 , the worker’s outside option is given by expected production in
an e wm a t c h :Ψ1 +( 1− Ψ1)p. Expected production in her current match, if
production was positive in the previous period, is b Ψ0+(1− b Ψ0)p,w h e r eb Ψ0 is
the updated probability that the current match be good. Her period-1 wage,
by Nash bargaining, will be given by a weighted average of those values:
w(1,Ψ0,Ψ1)=β[b Ψ0 +( 1− b Ψ0)p]+( 1− β)[Ψ1 +( 1− Ψ1)p]
= p +( 1− p)
h
βb Ψ0 +( 1− β)Ψ1
i
.
Since b h>b l, we obtain
Proposition 1: There is a cohort eﬀect on wages. That is,
w(1,h,Ψ1) >w (1,l,Ψ1)
for all Ψ1 whenever the match survives.
This is a direct consequence of the probability of good matches being pro-
cyclical. These wage values also determine the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁtf r o m
the match at t =1 ,g i v e nΨ0 and Ψ1, when the match survives. Denote that
proﬁtb y∆(Ψ0,Ψ1). It is given by the diﬀerence between expected produc-
tivity and the wage level at t =1 . A few steps of algebra reveal that
∆(Ψ0,Ψ1)=( 1− p)(1 − β)(b Ψ0 − Ψ1)
for all Ψ0,Ψ1.
At t =0 , competition among ﬁrms ensures that each worker is paid the
expected value of any new match to any ﬁrm given the current state of the
business cycle. Hence,
w(0,Ψ0,Ψ1)=Ψ0+(1−Ψ0)p+[Ψ0 +( 1− Ψ0)p][ρ∆(Ψ0,h)+( 1− ρ)∆(Ψ0,l)].
The ﬁrst two terms in this expression are expected productivity at t =0 .
The remaining term reﬂects the fact that, if production at t =0is positive
(which happens with probability Ψ0 +(1−Ψ0)p) the match will survive and
the ﬁrm will derive positive expected proﬁts at t =1 .
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.






for all Ψ0, Ψ1 whenever the match survives.
The proof is provided in Appendix A. The intuition for Proposition 2 is
simple. If the match lasts two periods, during the ﬁrst period the worker
is paid her exact outside option, which is entirely aﬀected by the current
state of the cycle. In the second period, however, given our Nash bargaining
assumption, her wage becomes a weighted average of her outside option and
her expected productivity, and the latter is not cyclical in this simple model.9
A comment is due on the robustness of these results to extensions of the
model to more than two periods. Although the formal complexity of the
solution would deﬁnitely increase, all our results should still hold in a more
complete model.10 In expected terms, good matches would tend to survive,
while bad matches would be abandoned. The same reasoning employed in
Proposition 2 can be used to show that higher wages will be less cyclical
than lower ones. Finally, the cohort eﬀect would still be present, although it
would diminish with increases in tenure.
The main prediction of the model is then that the sensitivity of wages to
current business cycle conditions falls with job tenure. As suggested above,
this can be interpreted as a progressive internalization of the employment
relationship as tenure is accumulated. The worker becomes progressively
shielded form the spot labor market. We should then observe a lower elas-
ticity of wages to variables related to the labor market stance as tenure is
accumulated. In the following sections, we put this prediction to the test
by estimating a wage function that, just as the w(t,Ψ0,Ψ1) function above,
allows for job tenure to interact with current and prior states of the business
cycle.
9In this setup we assume that the value of production is not aﬀected by current business
cycle conditions. Relaxing this assumption would not alter any of the results in this section.
10The choice of a two-period model has drawbacks. For example, our model does
not necessarily generate positive returns to tenure: depending on parameter values, if
(ψ0,ψ1)=( h,l) wages may be higher at t =0 . This is entirely due to the fact that ﬁrms
have to pay their future expected proﬁt from the match in period-0 wages, whereas in
period 1 there is no future. In an inﬁnite-horizon model, however, future proﬁts would be
a part of wages in all periods and positive returns to tenure would be a natural result.
103 Testing Methodology
In this section we introduce the diﬀerent regression models used to assess
the empirical evidence for the predictions presented above. With such a
set of empirical strategies we try to address a series of issues that might
not be captured by our basic regression models. These issues include the
sensitivity of the model’s results at diﬀerent wage levels, and the presence
of non-linearities in the process of learning about match quality captured by
job tenure.
3.1 Basic Empirical Model
The model outlined in section 2 has several empirically testable implications
for the process of wage determination. In particular, it entails that the
current wage is related to the opportunities available at the moment she was
hired and to the current conditions of the labor market11.E q u a t i o n( 1 ) ,o u r
b a s i cw a g ee q u a t i o n ,e n c o m p a s s e sa l lt h e s ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h et h e o r y :
lnw(i,t+j,t)=Xi,t+jθ1+θ2Ψ(t,j)+θ3teni,t+j+θ4teni,t+j∗Ψ(t,j)+εi,t+j (1)
That is, the wage paid in period t + j for an individual i who began
working in period t is a function of a vector of covariates Xi,t+j –which
includes experience, schooling, race, union and marital status, industry and
state dummies–, her tenure on the job and the labor market stance. The
cycle eﬀect is proxied by the local unemployment rate, Ψ(t,j).B o t h t h e
initial and the current values of the local unemployment rate will be used
below.12 Since we are mainly interested in the interaction between tenure,
which we use as an indirect measure of speciﬁc human capital accumulation,
11As mentioned above, a more complete model would also predict that wages are related
to the worker’s tenure in her job. We will also allow for this relationship in our empirical
speciﬁcation.
12Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) estimate a wage regression that does not include the
interaction term and consider three possible “values” for the unemployment rate, each
corresponding to a diﬀerent hypothesis about the labor market link. More speciﬁcally
they used the current unemployment rate, the unemployment rate at the start of the job
and the minimum unemployment rate since the job started. The use of the minimum
unemployment rate along the employment spell is not compatible with our model. We
will deal with this issue again in the results section.
11and the labor market stance captured through the unemployment rate, the
most important coeﬃcients for our purposes are θ2,θ 3 and θ4.
Our model predicts that θ3 and θ4 will be positive and θ2 negative. The
positive sign of θ3 derives from the existence of returns to tenure associated
with the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital in the form of learning
about match quality. When the initial unemployment rate is included in the
regression, the cohort eﬀect implies a negative value for θ2. The same is true
when we use the current unemployment rate, since external labor market
conditions do have an inﬂuence on wages. Evidence on this eﬀect is reported
in the inﬂu e n t i a lw o r kb yB l a n c h ﬂower and Oswald (1994) linking the local
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n dt h ew a g er a t eb ym e a n so ft h es oc a l l e dwage curve.
F i n a l l y ,t h es i g no ft h ei n t e r a c t i o nt e r mi si m p l i e db yP r o p o s i t i o n2 : t h e
sensitivity of wages to the business cycle should be decreasing with tenure.
3.2 Non-Linearities in Tenure Eﬀects
In the theoretical literature on returns to tenure and learning it has been sug-
gested that the learning process might not be continuous (see for example
Jovanovic, 1979). Learning takes place at a much faster rate at the begin-
ning of the match than later on. Not much empirical work on this issue is
available. In a recent paper, however, Farber (1999) presents evidence on
match duration. According to his ﬁndings, there are three key facts on job
tenure: long-term employment relationships are common; most new jobs end
early; and the probability of job change declines with tenure. These results,
particularly the second and third facts, point at a non-linearity in the process
of learning about match quality. Consequently, we would expect the process
of wage internalization to be much faster during the earlier stages of the
relationship.
In order to ﬁnd out whether this is true in our samples and if this might
inﬂuence the results of the previous model, we estimate equation (1) allowing
for structural breaks in the tenure eﬀect on wages. We do so by introducing
as p l i n eo nt h et e n u r ev a r i a b l e .M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, we model the relationship
between wages, tenure and the business cycle as a bilinear spline.With this
formulation we allow the wage rate to be a piecewise function of tenure, thus
permitting diﬀerent eﬀects for diﬀerent levels of tenure.
Let S be the number of knots and tens their respective value.Our tenure
variable is deﬁned as follows:
12ten1 = ten, tens =
½
(ten − tens−1) if ten > tens−1
0 otherwise (s =2 ,...,S)
xs = Ψ ∗ tens,f o rs =1 ,...,S
Given the coeﬃcient vectors α =[ α1,...,αS], and γ =[ γ1,...,γS] and the
intercept θ, w is deﬁned as:
w = θ + δ ∗ Ψ + α ∗ ten + γ ∗ x
The interpretation of the coeﬃcients is straightforward. More important
here are the coeﬃcients that represent changes in the “interaction eﬀect” of
the unemployment rate and tenure along grid lines ten = tens−1. Note that
the net eﬀects for each s can be found by adding these changes to their initial
eﬀects. The net main eﬀect of tenure is α1 + ... +αs and the net interaction
eﬀect is γ1 + ... + γs.
In section 5 we describe the particular application of this model to our
data, speciﬁcally including the question of identifying values for the knots.
4D a t a
In this section, we brieﬂy review the main data sources used in this paper.
For a more detailed description, we refer the reader to Appendix B. We use
two diﬀerent longitudinal data bases to investigate the existence of a tenure
eﬀect on wages: a Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) extract, and a
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) extract.
Our NLSY extract corresponds to the 1979-96 period. The NLSY is
better for our purposes not only because of its larger sample, but particularly
because it has better information on job tenure and a larger number of short
employment spells. Its major drawback is the fact that it surveys relatively
young people, thereby not being as representative of the overall labor force.
This makes job turnover much more frequent. However, it enables us to use
a greater number of spells, and it is more adequate to study issues related to
the timing of match learning and non-linearities in tenure eﬀects.
The PSID data covers the 1976-1983 period (except 1979, since the tenure
question was not included that year). This is a more representative panel
than the NLSY and slightly longer. However, its main problem is that the
wording of the tenure question has changed substantially over time. Before
1984 the question could have been interpreted as referring to duration of
continuous employment rather than time together with the present employer.
13After 1984, the question explicitly asks about time with the present employer.
This is particularly troubling given the key role that tenure plays not only
in the identiﬁcation of the employment spells, but also as an explanatory
variable in the empirical implementation.
These two extracts are merged by state and year with our measures of
the state of the business cycle. We use two indicator of the cycle: the state
monthly unemployment rate and the real grwoth rate of the Gross State
Product (GSP). The unemployment rate information is taken from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics and the GSP data are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
4.1 Descriptive Means
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of the main variables of
interest for the two data sets used in this paper. We restrict the analysis to
male workers. We are interested in the investigation of relatively long-term
attachment to the labor force as a way to guarantee the development of the
type of implicit agreements investigated here. Since males have more stable
labor force participation and matches are less likely to end due to reasons
not related with the match itself, one might suspect that they are more likely
to be covered by implicit wage-setting contracts.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The NLSY extract appears to have a lower proportion of unionized work-
ers and a lower average number of years of schooling than the PSID sample.
This is a result of the younger NLSY sample - average age in the NLSY sam-
ple is 23 years while it is 34 years in the PSID sample. The average length
of tenure is, as expected, smaller in the NLSY extract. This is, again, due to
the fact that it consists of a sample of young workers with higher turnover
and lower employer attachment. In addition, hourly wages are notably lower
in the NLSY extract. This diﬀerence reﬂects, among other factors, the expe-
rience and educational composition of both samples.
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5.1 Basic Results
In this section, we present evidence that higher levels of job tenure decrease
the sensitivity of wages to the business cycle. We present results for two dif-
ferent indicators of the business cycle: the state unemployment rate and the
gross state product real growth rate. We test the sensitivity of wages to both
the current stance of the business cycle and the one previaling at the start of
t h ej o b .W ed i s c u s sﬁrst the results obtained with the NLSY sample. This is
our preferred data set due to the higher quality of tenure recordings. Next,
we present the results obtained using the PSID. The PSID extract yields,
qualitatively, very similar results but with much higher standard errors.
Our main ﬁndings are shown in Table 2.13 We use a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel-
data model to estimate equation (1).14 We present the eﬀect of tenure on
the elasticity of current wages to the current local unemployment rate and
to the local unemployment rate at the start of the job. The NLSY results
correspond to the ﬁrst six lines of Table 2. The second and third columns
present the results when we measure the business cycle using the current
unemployment rate, whereas in the fourth and ﬁfth columns we report results
with the unemployment rate at the start of the job. The model in line (6)
allows for both the current and starting unemployment rates. As expected,
there are positive returns to tenure, and the main current wage-current local
unemployment rate elasticity is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
More importantly, and according to our prediction, that elasticity decreases
(in absolute value) with tenure.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Using the results arising from the NLSY sample we show that, considering
13The results reported throughout the paper were obtained using a demeaned tenure
variable. This means that the coeﬃcient on the business cycle indicator measures the
marginal impact evaluated at the mean value of tenure.
14Suppose that important demographic reshuﬄings of the workforce accompany changes
in the competitive environment, and that the elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate
diﬀers across demographic groups. One might then worry that the estimated coeﬃcient
on the interaction term captures some of these compositional changes in the workforce.
Controlling for a vector of individual characteristics captures observable changes in de-
mographic mix of the economy. Individual ﬁxed eﬀects further eliminate compositional
problems caused by unobserved chracteristics that are constant over time.
15the interaction between tenure and the unemployment rate, the eﬀect of a
one percent change in the current unemployment rate on wages is about
10% lower than the point estimate obtained when we don’t control for the
existence of the interaction eﬀect (The value of the elasticity falls from -0.0539
to -0.0487 and the model without the interaction term corresponds to line
1 in the Table). For the NLSY sample a one-standard-deviation change in
tenure decreases the elasticity of wages to the current unemployment rate by
more than 1 percentage point (note that this represents a reduction of almost
25% over the elasticity computed at mean tenure): at the sample mean for
tenure, the elasticity would be reduced from -0.048 to -0.037. These results
are similar if we use the unemployment rate prevailing at the start of the
job. The eﬀect of initial conditions dies out over time even more rapidly as
tenure is accumulated.
The results in Table 2 show that higher values of tenure reduce the elas-
ticity of wages to the current unemployment rate and the unemployment rate
at the start of the job. The empirical evidence is favorable to our hypothe-
ses and can be interpreted as indicating not only that initial conditions die
out over time as tenure accumulates, but also that the longer the match the
more shielded the worker is from the vagaries of the external labor market,
as measured by the current local unemployment rate. This is consistent with
the explanation presented in the model. The development of an internal la-
bor market is a function of the length of job tenure, in the sense that the
worker appropriates a fraction of the return to ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
accumulated with tenure.15
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) estimate an equation similar to (1) but do
not include the interaction term. Their results are that the costless mobility
model (in which the relevant measure of the unemployment rate is the min-
imum unemployment rate since the start of the job) is the one that prevails
when confronted with the other hypotheses, thereby rejecting the spot market
model. We see our results as an alternative explanation to theirs. By simply
including a tenure interaction we obtain a result that is not consistent with
a spot labor market in wage determination and favors a contractual model
of the labor market. In order to further compare our results with those in
15In all the speciﬁcations of Table 2, we have restricted the returns to all the demographic
variables to be constant over time. These restrictions might not be realistic, at least
for some of these variables. We therefore checked the robustness of these speciﬁcation
assumptions allowing the returns to some of the variables (namely experience, education,
unionization, race and marital status) to vary over time. The basic results were not altered.
16Beaudry and DiNardo we ran our models with the minimum unemployment
rate. The interaction term always played an important role in the reduction
of the cyclical sensitivity of wages, regardless of the business cycle indicator
used in the regression.
The ﬁndings obtained using the PSID are presented in lines 7 to 12 of
Table 2. Conclusions are very similar to the ones that follow from using the
PSID sample. Note that the PSID yields larger elasticities but also larger
standard errors. The impact of an additional month of tenure in the current
wage-current local unemployment rate elasticity is very similar in the NLSY
and PSID extracts. However, evaluated at the sample mean for tenure, the
percentage reduction in the elasticity is smaller for the PSID than it was for
the NLSY.
There is a possible impact of selectivity in our results. In our sample,
we exclude nonemployed persons since we don’t observe their market wage.
However, the cyclicality of wages can be motivated by persons moving in
and out of workforce, namely if these persons’ wages have a very pronounced
cyclical behavior. We followed the approach in Bils (1985) and tested the
impact of excluding nonemployed persons reestimating model (1) using the
lambda procedure sugested by Heckman (1979). The results imply that wages
are more procyclical for persons moving in and out of the work force, thus
increasing our estimates of the unemployment rate and the interaction term.
However, given the high standard errors obtained with the econometric pro-
cedure, whether the selctivity bias is in fact important cannot be judged with
much conﬁdence.
5.2 Testing the results’ robustness
The basic regression framework in the previous section may not capture
some relevant relationships between wages and the cycle. According to the
model proposed above, the wage level is a function, among other factors,
of ﬁrm- and worker-speciﬁc human capital and match quality. Firms (or
jobs) that invest more in worker-speciﬁc human capital and that prefer (or
require) stable long-term relationships are expected to pay higher wages and
to have a steeper wage proﬁle. We would like to control for diﬀerences in the
relative importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. In particular, it could be
t h ec a s et h a tt h ec y c l eh i td i ﬀerent schooling groups diﬀerentially and that
tenure could be correlated with schooling. To control for this we add to the
previous speciﬁcation an interaction between the business cycle indicator and
17schooling.
Another issue that we would like to control for is the possibility that the
demand for older workers, independent of tenure, be less cyclical. In order to
do this we add the interaction of age and the business cycle indicator. The
r e s u l t so b t a i n e da r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e3 .
[Insert Table 3 here]
Evaluated at mean age and schooling the elasticity of wages to the current
unemployment rate is -0.046 (otained from column (1) results), slightly lower
than before. Also, the impact of tenure on the elasticity of wages to the
business cycle conditions remains unchanged; more tenure implies a smaller
elasticity. It is interesting to note that this eﬀect occurs on top of the impact
of age in the elasticity of wages. We obtain a positive interaction between age
and the unemployment rate: the demand for older workers is less cyclical.
The same result applies for more educated workers. From column (3) we
obtain that workers with higher levels of schooling have a less cyclical wage,
and the impact of starting conditions is also smaller.
In the literature on wage cyclicality the unemployment rate is the most
common indicator of the business cycle (see Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995)
but some studies use other indicators of economic activity, such as the level
of production measured by GDP (see for example, Blank, 1990 and Solon et
al, 1994). In order to measure labor market pressure on wages it is more ap-
propriate to use regional level variables, and we use the Gross State Product
(GSP) real growth rate as an alternative indicator of the business cycle.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The results presented in Table 4 conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings. There is a
positive elasticity of wages to the GSP real rate of growth, but this elasticity
is decreasing in tenure. The elasticity to the current GSP growth rate is
reduced from 0.315 to 0.163 when we take the tenure eﬀe c ti n t oa c c o u n ta n d
evaluate it at mean tenure in our NLSY sample.
The results regarding the GSP growth rate at the start of the job are
reported in columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 and they also conﬁrm previous
results on the diminuishing impact of starting conditions on a worker’s wage
as tenure accumulates. The ﬁnal column reports the coeﬃcient estimates of
a model speciﬁcation similar to the one in Table 3. As before, wages are less
cyclical for older and more tenured workers and the two eﬀects reinforce each
18other. The same is true for more educated workers. Note that detrending
the unemployment rate measure (in order to ﬁlter low frequencies variations)
does not change the main results16.
5.3 Evidence on Non-Linearities in Tenure Eﬀects
The last set of results refers to the existence of non-linearities in the tenure/
unemployment rate interaction. They are obtained by estimating the bilinear
spline model introduced in Section 3.2.
There is no theoretical guidance about the determination of the knots for
the tenure variable. As we already noted, some previous empirical evidence
on labor mobility suggests a structural break early on in the employment
relationship, a period in which a large percentage of all full-time matches are
expected to end (see Farber, 1999). However, no general evidence has been
presented that might help us in the process of determining the value of the
knots. The procedure we follow starts from a general formulation, with a
large number of knots, and progressively reduces that number by dropping
those knots that are not statistically signiﬁcant. We are thereby left with a
very simple model, with a single knot for tenure –at 52 weeks of employment
duration– using the NLSY sample.
The ﬁndings presented in Tables 5 and 6 show that using model (1), there
is a statistically signiﬁcant structural break along tenure equal to 52 weeks
(see Table 6). The point estimate obtained in Table 5 indicates that an
additional week of tenure in the ﬁrst year of work has a much larger impact
on the current wage-current local unemployment rate elasticity than later
on.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
This result is extremely interesting when we interpret a match as an expe-
rience good. In this case, match tenure deﬁnes the period of learning about
match quality that took place. Our result, together with our hypothesis
about ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital acquisition, suggests that learning about match
quality occurs much faster early on in the match, bad matches being termi-
nated early as well. The eﬀect of tenure after this ﬁrst period much smaller.
16To make the results easier to compare with other papers we decided to report the
ones obtained with the raw variables. The ones obtained with the ﬁltered variables are
available from the authors upon request.
19Nevertheless, it is still statistically diﬀerent from zero and can be interpreted
exclusively as the result of the process of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital accu-
mulation.
Finally, from the results shown in Table 5 we can also conclude that a
one-standard-deviation increase on tenure reduces the elasticity of current
wages to the current unemployment rate by 0.0247 (the elasticity goes from
-0.0342 to -0.0095, which represents a reduction of more than 70%). This is
a larger reduction than the one obtained in our previous models.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The relation between internal and external labor markets has been exten-
sively discussed in recent years. So has the issue of the existence of returns
to tenure. In this paper, we have drawn from both these analyses to examine
the process by which wages are set in relation to the time a worker has spent
in her current job. That is, we have posed the question of how job tenure
and labor market conditions interact in the process of wage determination.
First, we presented a simple matching model where tenure in the current
job is interpreted as a proxy for match-speciﬁc human capital accumulated in
the employment relationship. As tenure progresses, then, the worker seizes
af r a c t i o no ft h er i s i n gv a l u eo ft h a ts p e c i ﬁc capital. Such appropriation
gradually shields her from cyclical variations in the external labor market
conditions. The wage-setting process becomes progressively “internalized”.
The empirical evidence we presented lends support to that prediction.
The elasticity of current wages to unemployment rates decreases with tenure.
We tested our ﬁndings’ robustness by including the worker’s years of school-
ing and age interacted with the cycle in our regressions. The worker’s wage
proved to be less cyclical for older and more educated workers, but this im-
pact is obtained on top of the main impact of tenure on the wage elasticity,
which remains present in these speciﬁcations. Finally, we considered the pos-
sibility that the tenure eﬀect on wages be non-linear. Our ﬁndings lead us to
conclude that the internalization of the wage-setting process is faster at the
beginning of an employment spell than later on.
The results presented in this paper suggest that the study of issues related
with the cyclicality of wages should take into account the tenure composi-
tion of the pool of workers. If one is to ﬁnd evidence of greater exposure
of workers to the vagaries of the external labor market, that might not only
20be an indication of a change in wage policy in the direction of spot market
wage setting. It might also be a sign that a non-wage human resources policy
is being implemented (see Capelli, 1995). For example, it can be the result
of a “recomposition” of the pool towards a greater presence of less tenured
workers, which is consistent with the common wisdom that industry restruc-
turing and downsizing processes hit harder older and white-collar workers
–precisely those with higher employer attachment and more likely to be in
these type of implicit agreement contracts.
Clearly, however, further research is needed into how our conclusions
about the process of wage determination and, consequently, the eﬀects of
policies on that process depend on job tenure. A richer dynamic model that
captures the timing and diﬀerent characteristics of match-speciﬁc human cap-
ital investments would be instructive. Additionally, the availability of better
micro data, namely at the ﬁrm level, would also help in discriminating how
diﬀerent groups of workers will be aﬀected, and how the process of learn-
ing about workers’ ability interacts with the process of ﬁrm-speciﬁch u m a n
capital accumulation.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 2






β[b Ψ0+(1−b Ψ0)p]+(1−β)[h+(1−h)p] >
l+(1−l)p+[l+(1−l)p][ρ∆(l,h)+(1−ρ)∆(l,l)]
h+(1−h)p+[h+(1−h)p][ρ∆(h,h)+(1−ρ)∆(h,l)].
The ratio on the right-hand side is clearly larger than
l+(1−l)p
h+(1−h)p, since







ρ∆(h,h)+(1−ρ)∆(h,l) < 1. As can be easily veriﬁed, this condition is auto-
matically satisﬁed in our model.
AP P E NDI X B
Dat a des c r i pt i o n
21The NLSY is a panel started in 1979 with 12,686 men and women with
ages ranging from 14 to 21 years. In this study, we include data through
1996. The subsample we use includes only men, from the three survey sam-
ples, since restricting the sample to the cross-sectional sample of the NLSY
did not change the results. It was transformed so that each observation cor-
responds to an employment spell. For each individual, several observations
were created. We did so using the variable in the Workhistory data base that
links jobs over years. Since each individual reports up to 5 jobs each year, the
employer code was used to construct a variable that, for each job reported in
a given year, contains information on whether that job was reported in the
previous year. This allows us to track each new match while it is one of the 5
reported jobs. The wage measure is the deﬂated hourly wage, obtained using
the Consumer Price Index (1982-1984=100). We excluded any observation
for which the deﬂated hourly wage is less than 1 and more than 100 USD.
Wages were reported every year for each employment spell, along with
information on industry, occupation, marital status, age, experience, tenure,
race, union status, and the state of residence. Additionally, for each obser-
vation we merged this information with the current local unemployment rate
–deﬁned as the monthly unemployment rate for the state of residence–, the
national unemployment rate and the unemployment rate at the start of the
job, both at the national and state levels (the latter is available only after
1978).
In order to compute the unemployment rate at the time of job start,
when not observing the beginning of the spell we used the information on
the length of tenure with the present employer. We then computed the
approximate year and month at which the worker started working with her
present employer. We assumed that employment started in the same place
as it occurs now. After deleting observations due to missing information, the
data base resulting from this procedure has 19,092 employment spells from
5,753 diﬀerent individuals, an average of 3.32 for each individual.
As regards the PSID, it is a longer panel but it has a much poorer record-
ing of job tenure. This is very important given the relevance of tenure in our
empirical application and the fact that we are interested in studying wage
levels over workers’ tenure proﬁl e s . T h et e n u r eq u e s t i o nw a sﬁrst included
in 1976, but it was discontinued in 1979. Given these restrictions, we do not
gain too much variation in terms of the business cycle over the NLSY. The
only advantage of the PSID refers to the unemployment rate at the start of
the job, but the limited availability of state-level unemployment rates reduces
22the usefulness of such information.
We included waves for 1976-1978 and 1980-1993, and generated 9,657
employment spells corresponding to 4,707 individuals, an average of 2.05 for
each individual. We used the subsample of men, heads of household, from
the "SRC" sample, thus not including low-income families in the sample. We
identiﬁed an employment spell, following Brown and Light (1992), as being
observed for the ﬁrst time whenever the reported tenure was less than the
elapsed time since the previous interview. This is what Brown and Light
call partition T. In principle, this partition would work adequately if there
were no errors in the report of tenure with an employer and if workers never
returned to the same employer. This is obviously not the case, and Brown
and Light identify a reasonable number of inconsistencies derived from the
use of this partition. We disregarded all the observations that do not have
a consistent (within a given range) starting date whenever the same job was
seen more than once, as proposed by Brown and Light.
As with the NLSY extract, additional information on the set of covari-
ates was recorded and all the spells with missing information were deleted.
The same procedure was used to merge the unemployment rate with each
observation. Again, the wage measure is the deﬂated hourly wage, obtained
using the Consumer Price Index (1982-1984=100) and we excluded any ob-
servation for which the deﬂated hourly wage is less than 1 and more than
100 USD.
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Descriptive Statistics: NLSY and PSID  Individual Data 
Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variables description  NLSY PSID
Log real hourly wage
(a)  1.378 2.206
 (0.416) (0.610)
Log state current unemployment rate  1.892 1.872
 (0.320) (0.291)
Log state unemployment rate at start of job  1.876 1.909
 (0.337) (0.221)












(c)  277.030 16.828
 (191.593) (10.918)
Union status  0.151 0.224
 (0.359) (0.417)
Highest grade completed  11.790 12.546
 (2.357) (2.719)
Northeast region  0.178 0.162
 (0.383) (0.369)
North Central region  0.236 0.230
 (0.425) (0.421)
South region  0.388 0.442
 (0.487) (0.497)
West region  0.198 0.166
 (0.398) (0.372)
 
1. The NLSY data is composed of male workers in NLSY over the period 1979-1996. 
   The PSID data is composed of male workers in PSID over the period 1976-1993. 
2. The construction and definition of variables are contained in the Appendix. 
3. When required, variables are deflated using the CPI (1982-1984=100). 
4. (a) Tenure is measured in years. 
      (c) Experience is measured in weeks for the NLSY extract and in years for the PSID 
extract. 
5. State monthly unemployment rates are taken from the Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPI index is taken from the BLS. 
6. Gross state product real growth rates are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
7. Industry sectors included were: Agriculture, forestry and fisheries; Mining; Construction; 
Transportation, communications, public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; Finance 
insurance and real estate; Business and repair services; Personal services; Entertainment and 
recreation services; Professional and related services; Public Administration.   27
Table 2 
 
Effect of Tenure on the Elasticity of Current Wage to the Local Unemployment Rate: 
Basic Regression Model 
 
Dependent variable: Log (wijt) 
 
 
   Tenure Log  Current 
Unemployment 
Rate 







Rate at Start of 
Job 
Tenure * Log 
Unemployment 
Rate at Start of 
Job  
(x100) 




   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)     
1  NLSY    -0.0539      40,836 Yes 
      (0.0066)         
2 NLSY 0.0943  -0.0487  0.4576      40,836 Yes 
   (0.0070)  (0.0089)  (0.2080)         
3  NLSY      -0.0534   40,394 Yes 
         (0.0076)       
4 NLSY 0.0149      -0.0485  0.7810  40,394 Yes 
   (0.0043)      (0.0081)  (0.1888)     
5  NLSY    -0.0559  -0.0096   40,394 Yes 
     (0.0063)    (0.0091)       
6  NLSY  0.0313  -0.0441 0.2982 -0.0103 0.1299  40,394 Yes 
   (0.0019)  (0.0074)  (0.1223)  (0.0099)  (0.2272)     
7  PSID    -0.0719      18,181 Yes 
      (0.0211)         
8 PSID  0.0059  -0.0662  0.3518      18,181 Yes 
   (0.0055)  (0.0247)  (0.2698)         
9  PSID      -0.0842   12,358 Yes 
         (0.0223)       
10 PSID  0.0250      -0.0812  0.4020  12,358 Yes 
   (0.0032)      (0.0225)  (0.1768)     
11  PSID    -0.0817  -0.0101   12,358 Yes 
     (0.0232)    (0.0226)       
12  PSID  0.0197  -0.0771 0.2056 -0.0097 0.3380  12,358 Yes 
   (0.0068)  (0.0233)  (0.1005)  (0.0257)  (0.1074)     
 
1. Data in lines 1 to 6 is composed of a panel of workers from the NLSY over the period 1979-1996. Data 
in lines 7 to 12 is composed of a panel of workers from the PSID over the period 1976-1993. In columns 
2 and 3 the business cycle is measured by the log current unemployment rate and in columns 4 and 5 it 
is measured by the log unemployment rate at the start of the job. 
2. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Dependent variable is log deflated hourly wage. 
3. Covariates included in each regression are 4 region dummies, year dummies and 11 industry dummies. 
Additional covariates included in each regression are experience, experience squared, tenure squared, 
education (years of schooling), marital status dummy, union dummy, white dummy and government job 
dummy. 
4. The tenure variable was demeaned so that the coefficient on the unemployment rate measures the 
marginal impact evaluated at the mean value of tenure. 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-year 
cells. N is the sample size. 
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Table 3 
 
Effect of Tenure on the Elasticity of Current Wage to the Different Measures of the  
Business Cycle: Robustness Checks Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: Log (wijt) 
 
  NLSY 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log Current Unemployment Rate  -0.1584    -0.2527 
 (0.0482)    (0.0472) 
Log Unemployment Rate at Start of Job   -0.1029  0.0104 
   (0.0529)  (0.0556) 
Log Current UR * Tenure (X100)  0.2615    0.0141 
 (0.1112)    (0.0022) 
Log U. Rate at Start of Job * Tenure    0.0076  0.0011 
   (0.0019)  (0.0023) 
Log Current UR * School  -0.0017    0.0055 
 (0.0028)    (0.0027) 
Log Current UR * Age  0.0057    0.0120 
 (0.0019)    (0.0018) 
Log U. Rate at Start of Job * School    0.0033  0.0055 
   (0.0029)  (0.0035) 
Log U. Rate at Start of Job * Age    -0.0069  -0.0083 
   (0.0021)  (0.0025) 
Individual Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  40,836 40,394 40,394 
 
1. Data is composed of a panel of workers from the NLSY over the period 1979-1996. 
2. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Dependent variable is log deflated hourly wage. 
3. Covariates included in each regression are 4 region dummies, year dummies and 11 
industry dummies. Additional covariates included in each regression are experience, 
experience squared, tenure squared, marital status dummy, union dummy, white dummy and 
government job dummy. 
4. The tenure variable was demeaned so that the coefficient on the unemployment rate 
measures the marginal impact evaluated at the mean value of tenure. 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within 





Effect of Tenure on the Elasticity of Current Wage to the Different Measures of the Business Cycle: 
Robustness Checks Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: Log (wijt) 
 
  Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Current GSP Real Growth Rate   0.3149    0.1633    0.2916  0.2694  0.3133 
 (0.0794)   (0.0808)   (0.1390)  (0.1451) (0.1453)
GSP Real Growth Rate Start of Job    0.2575    0.1700  0.0521  0.0212  0.1622 
   (0.1179)  (0.1232)  (0.1148)  (0.0688) (0.1314)
Current GSP * Tenure      -0.0308     -0.1043 -0.2178
     (0.0106)    (0.0460) (0.0689)
GSP at Start of Job * Tenure        -0.1537    -0.1109 -0.1095
       (0.0629)  (0.0556) (0.0556)
Current  GSP  *  School         -0.1355
         (0.0517)
Current  GSP  *  Age         -0.0458
         (0.0483)
GSP at Start of Job * School              0.0379 
         (0.0435)
GSP at Start of Job * Age              -0.0817
         (0.0483)
Individual  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  40,836 40,394 40,836 40,394 40,394 40,394 40,394 
 
1. Data is composed of a panel of workers from the NLSY over the period 1979-1996. 
2. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Dependent variable is log deflated hourly wage. 
3. Covariates included in each regression are 4 region dummies, year dummies and 11 industry dummies. 
Additional covariates included in each regression are experience, experience squared, tenure squared, marital 
status dummy, union dummy, white dummy and government job dummy. 
4. The tenure variable was demeaned so that the coefficient on the gross state product measures the marginal 
impact evaluated at the mean value of tenure. 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-year cells. N is 
the sample size. 
 
 




Non-linearities in Tenure Effects on the Elasticity of Current Wage to the Current Local 
Unemployment Rate: Bilinear Splines Estimates 
 
Dependent variable: Log (wijt) 
(Fixed-effects model estimates) 
 
 
  NLSY 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log Current Unemployment Rate  -0.0342    -0.0448 
  (0.0202)  (0.0622) 
Log Unemployment Rate Start of Job    -0.0338  -0.0373 
   (0.0239)  (0.0648) 
Tenure(1) 0.0416  0.0613  0.1163 
 (0.0368)  (0.0289)  (0.0305) 
Tenure(2) 0.0666  0.0145  0.0185 
 (0.0065)  (0.0037)  (0.0048) 
Schooling 0.0062  0.0290  0.0292 
 (0.0021)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Log U. Rate Current * Tenure(1)  0.0365    0.0174 
  (0.0188)  (0.0050) 
Log U. Rate Current * Tenure(2)  0.0076    0.0831 
  (0.0022)  (0.0242) 
Log U. Rate Start of Job * Tenure(1)    0.0138  0.0208 
   (0.0151)  (0.0520) 
Log U. Rate Start of Job * Tenure(2)    0.0102  0.0046 
   (0.0019)  (0.0022) 
N   40,836  40,603  40,603 
 
1. Data is composed of a panel of workers from the NLSY over the period 1979-1996. The business cycle 
is measured by the log current unemployment rate. 
2. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Dependent variable is log deflated hourly wage. 
3. Covariates included in each regression are 4 region dummies, year dummies and 11 industry dummies. 
Additional covariates included in each regression are experience, experience squared, tenure squared, 
marital status dummy, union dummy, white dummy and government job dummy. 
4. The tenure variable was demeaned so that the coefficient on the unemployment rate measures the 
marginal impact evaluated at the mean value of tenure. 
5. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are corrected to allow for group effects within state-year 
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Table 6 
 
F-tests of the Bilinear Spline Model Estimates in Table 6 
 
 
  NLSY 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Total Effect  60.56  376.83  414.82 
      
Total unemployment rate effect  16.69  69.40  104.32 
      
Main unemployment rate effect  23.82  25.62  19.03 
      
Total tenure effect  69.86  338.60  350.33 
      
Main tenure effect  54.78  16.45  23.44 
      
Interaction effect  10.52  32.06  24.60 
      
Structural change along tenure = 52 
weeks 
53.98 19.29 15.23 
      
 
 
 